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Employees’ engagement in safety is assumed to be a significant contributor to safety 
performance within the chemical industry. The current study tested this assumption by 
examining the role of prosocial safety behaviors (e.g., helping others) and proactive 
safety behaviors (e.g., seeking change) in predicting four safety performance outcomes: 
micro-accidents, property damage (accidents without injury), near-miss events, and lost-
time injuries. Two-wave data collected from 511 employees located in 2 Italian 
chemical plants revealed that prosocial safety behaviors predicted micro-accidents and 
property damage, and proactive safety behaviors predicted near-miss events and lost-
time injuries. These results suggest that benefits can be gained from distinguishing 
between prosocial and proactive safety behaviors when seeking to improve safety 
performance. Organizations may reduce the rate of minor injuries and property damage 
by increasing helping among employees. However, this approach will be less effective 
in reducing more serious accidents or increasing near-miss event reporting. More 
effective in these cases is creating environments in which employees feel able to raise 
their suggestions and concerns about safety. 
Keywords: Chemical; Proactive safety behavior; Prosocial safety behavior; Safety 
participation.




The importance of human action in the causation of workplace accidents and 
incidents is well established (e.g., Hale & Glendon, 1987; Seo, 2005; Williamson & 
Feyer, 1990). Early work illustrated this by showing that unsafe acts were positively 
related to accident rates (e.g., Reason, 1997), and that compliance with safety 
procedures was negatively related to near-misses (Goldenhar, Williams & Swanson, 
2003). In subsequent research, attention turned to employees’ active participation in 
safety, where it was shown that employees’ active engagement in related initiatives 
resulted in improved safety performance (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Neal & Griffin, 
2006).  Indeed, research shows that, when compared to safety compliance, safety 
participation is more effective longer-term at reducing workplace accidents and injuries 
through the creation of a better context supporting work safety; and that this effect is 
consistent across work contexts (Clarke 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2006). As a consequence, 
safety participation has become the focus of much research in a bid to understand how 
these acts, which are volitional in nature, may be promoted (Christian et al., 2009; 
Griffin & Neal, 2000; Martinez-Córcoles, Schöbel, Gracia, Tomás & Peiró, 2012; Neal 
& Griffin, 2006).  
Safety participation comprises a number of specific acts, such as helping others, 
voicing concerns about safety and looking out for the welfare of others (Neal, Griffin & 
Hart, 2000). Typically these acts are presented in the safety literature as belonging to a 
single class of behavior, which arguably implies that they are all of equal importance in 
predicting an organization’s safety performance (i.e., injuries, accidents and near-miss 
events). However, research in non-safety domains has shown that specific acts of 
participation (as manifested in their general form) are associated with different 
antecedents and outcomes (e.g., LePine, Erez & Johnson, 2002; McAllister, Kamdar, 
Morrison & Tumbar, 2007). One implication of this for safety research is that current 
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conceptualizations of safety participation as a single construct may be too simplistic and 
in danger of missing important differences in how these specific acts relate to different 
safety performance outcomes.  
The current study addresses the possibility of this limitation by looking at the 
role that two types of safety participation behaviors (prosocial and proactive) play in 
predicting an organization’s safety performance. More specifically, it asks the question 
of whether safety outcomes, such as accidents and near-miss events, are best predicted 
by prosocial acts (e.g., helping others) or proactive acts (e.g., raising suggestions for 
change). Examining these relationships will contribute to the literature in two important 
ways. First, it will tease apart the effects of different acts of safety participation on 
safety outcomes and provide organizations with a more detailed understanding of which 
acts to target in their efforts to improve safety. Second, it will extend current models of 
safety that concentrate on safety participation as a final outcome  (e.g., Clarke & Ward, 
2006; Conchie & Donald, 2009; Conchie, Taylor & Donald, 2012) by showing how 
these acts subsequently relate to the final link in the chain: safety performance 
outcomes. In the following sections we review research in this area and then present the 
findings of a longitudinal study that was carried out in the Chemical industry. 
1.2 Safety Participation: Prosocial and Proactive Behaviors 
Safety participation, as defined by acts such as helping co-workers with safety, 
seeking to promote the safety program, and making suggestions for change, shares a 
number of similarities with general organizational behaviors refereed to as acts of 
citizenship (Organ, 1988; van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Similar to safety participation, 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) are voluntary work behaviors that hold a 
positive value to the organization, but are not recognized by the formal reward system. 
As such, their omission is not generally understood as punishable (Podsakoff, 
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MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000), and they are generally difficult to promote 
through formal routes.  
A number of multi-dimensional models of how OCBs group together have been 
proposed (e.g., Organ, Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 2006). Prominent among these are 
models that distinguish between OCBs that are prosocial and those that are proactive 
(e.g., van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Prosocial behaviors are affiliative in nature and 
typically manifest as helping colleagues and looking out for their welfare. Essentially, 
they focus on ensuring safety of the social group and on fostering good social 
relationships. In contrast, proactive behaviors are challenging in nature and seek to 
bring about positive change in workplace practices, such as in safety. These behaviors 
are less focused on social relationships and more focused on system changes. While 
both sets of behaviors are related by their volitional nature, they are distinct in as far as 
prosocial behaviors focus on cooperation, and proactive behaviors focus on challenge. 
For this reason, proactive behaviors carry more risk when they are performed owing to 
the possibility that they may be regarded as criticism of current (safety) management 
systems.  
The notion that prosocial and proactive behaviors are distinct, yet related, 
constructs has gained much support in non-safety domains. Studies have shown, for 
example, that prosocial and proactive behaviors are differentially related to individual 
and organizational processes. LePine and van Dyne (2001) showed that agreeableness 
was positively related to prosocial behaviors but negatively related to proactive 
behaviors. Graham and van Dyne (2006) showed that self-esteem and justice impacted 
proactive behaviors but not prosocial behaviors. Van Dyne, Kamdar and Joireman 
(2008) found that role perceptions differentially moderated the effects of leadership on 
each type of behavior. Namely, when leadership was low, regarding behaviors as part of 
one’s job increased prosocial behaviors, but had no effect on proactive behaviors.  
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Within the domain of safety, research on OCBs—as they relate specifically to 
safety—is relatively less advanced and tends to treat these behaviors as a single 
construct (in much the same way as safety participation research) (Conchie & Donald, 
2009; Hofmann, Morgeson & Gerras, 2003; Mearns & Reader, 2008; Turner, Chmiel, & 
Wall, 2005). However, within constructs of safety citizenship behavior are six sub-
dimensions of action: (i) helping (assisting colleagues to fulfill their safety 
responsibilities); (ii) stewardship (protecting colleagues from risks and dangers); (iii) 
initiating change (taking action to improve safety); (iv) voice (promoting the safety of 
activities); (v) civic virtue (being involved in non-mandatory organizational programs 
and meetings), and (vi) whistleblowing (reporting those who violate safety procedures) 
(Hofmann et al., 2003). These sub-dimensions mirror those from the general OCB 
literature and suggest that safety behaviors may too be teased apart to look at their 
differential effects on outcomes. Indeed, support for this suggestion comes from recent 
research that shows these behaviors operate differently with safety processes. In a study 
looking at the effects of leaders on citizenship behaviors, Conchie (2013) showed that 
leaders influenced employees’ proactive safety behaviors by increasing their intrinsic 
motivation, but affected their prosocial safety behaviors through a different route (one 
not identified in the study). Further, Curcuruto, Guglielmi and Mariani (2013) found 
that team climate influenced proactive behaviors by increasing proactive orientation, but 
influenced prosocial behaviors by increasing affective commitment. In light of such 
differences, we propose in the following section that prosocial and proactive safety 
behaviors have a different relationship with safety performance outcomes.  
1.3 Prosocial Behaviors, Proactive Behaviors and Safety Performance Outcomes  
An organization’s safety performance can be measured by tangible events, such 
as the frequency of injuries, accidents or near-misses. These outcomes are distinct from 
individual safety behaviors, such as those discussed in Section 1.2, which precede 
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performance outcomes in time and may contribute to their occurrence (Christian et al., 
2009). Evidence suggests that specific safety behaviors have a differential influence on 
safety performance outcomes. Namely, that prosocial safety behaviors may be more 
important in predicting the frequency of micro-accidents and accidents that involve no 
injury, while proactive safety behaviors may be more important in predicting the 
frequency of near-miss events and lost-time injuries.  
1.3.1 Prosocial safety behaviors, micro-accidents and accidents without injury 
 Micro-accidents are on-the-job injuries that require medical attention, but do not 
incur lost workdays (Zohar, 2000; 2002a). Compared to accidents, micro-accidents are 
more frequent and offer a reliable outcome measure against which antecedents, such as 
safety behaviors, may be tested. Their primary cause is linked to individual unsafe 
action, which predicts the frequency of micro-accidents over and above the level of risk 
inherent within the workplace (e.g., unsafe conditions; Zohar, 2000; 2002a). For this 
reason, it can be assumed that interventions focused on correcting employee unsafe 
behaviors are likely to see a bigger reduction in the rate of these events than 
interventions focused solely on structural features.  
Applying this finding to the current discussion suggests that prosocial behaviors 
may play a stronger role in predicting an organization’s rate of micro-accidents, when 
compared to proactive behaviors. This is because prosocial behaviors are concerned 
with looking out for the safety of others and helping teach co-workers safer ways of 
working. It is less focused on bringing about improvements in the conditions in which 
people operate or the procedures by which tasks are completed. This latter focus is 
concentrated more on structural type changes and sits more comfortably with proactive 
safety behaviors. As such, we might expect prosocial safety behaviors to be negatively 
related with micro-accidents such that an increase in prosocial behaviors will be 
associated with a reduction in the rate of on-the-job injuries that require medical 
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attention. Geller (2001, 2002) offered some support for this suggestion by showing that 
micro-accidents were related to the level of support among co-workers. As such we 
predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: Prosocial safety behaviors are negatively related to the rate of micro-
accidents. 
Within some industries, an organization’s safety performance may be measured by 
the rate of property damage (i.e., damage to structures and machinery). These events are 
often regarded as accidents that do not involve injury, but which have the potential to 
lead to injury through their enactment. Some research suggests that property damage 
may stem from inadequate maintenance of machinery or technological structures 
(Geller, 2001). However, these events are more often attributed to human factors such 
as a lack of training or poor monitoring of the safety system (Christian, Bradley, 
Wallace & Burke, 2009), or human error in the usage of machinery and failing to follow 
work procedures (Hansez & Chmiel, 2010). Given the focus on working practices that 
may be overcome through training and education, it seems plausible that the rate of 
property damage would be negatively related to prosocial safety behaviors. More 
specifically, we would expect that environments defined by support and cooperation to 
be marked by greater knowledge and competence in using the equipment and complying 
with procedures, and a reduction in the misuse of machinery.  
Hypothesis 2: Prosocial safety behaviors are negatively related to the rate of 
property damage (accidents without injury).  
1.3.2 Proactive safety behaviors, lost time injuries and near-miss events  
In contrast to micro-accidents, lost-time injuries are often predicted by unsafe 
conditions that lie dormant within the system until they are triggered by an unsafe act 
(Reason, 1997). They are lower in frequency than micro-accidents as their occurrence 
requires several antecedent factors to exist, some of which may be technological in 
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nature. Micro-accidents, by contrast, may arise from a single antecedent factor and often 
these relate to human behavior, such as an unsafe act. Behavioral safety interventions, 
for example, have been shown to reduce micro-accidents more effectively than lost-time 
injuries (Cavalleri & Gobba, 1989; Zohar, 2002b). 
The recognition that unsafe conditions are the primary cause of these events has 
given rise to much research focused on identifying ways in which these conditions may 
be improved before a negative event happens (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). One method 
through which this corrective action may take place is by employees’ voicing their 
concerns about existing practices and making suggestions for change (Curcuruto, 
Guglielmi & Mariani, 2014; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). These proactive safety 
behaviors focus at an organizational level and are invaluable for organizational learning, 
as they allow for the identification and anticipation of potential hazards within the 
system that may trigger a lost time injury; thus preventing their negative consequences 
before they happen (Hollnagel, Paries, Wood & Wreathall,  2011). Prosocial safety 
behaviors are generally less effective in this regard as they focus on facilitating 
interpersonal relations, such as cooperation, and as such have their biggest impact on 
unsafe behaviors rather than system changes. Based on this reasoning, we predict that:    
Hypothesis 3: Proactive safety behaviors are negatively related to the rate of lost 
time injuries.   
An organization’s vulnerability to accidents and injury is signaled by their rate 
of reported near-miss events. A near-miss event is a hazardous situation in which an 
accident could have resulted, but did not because of some random or planned 
intervention (Jones, Kirchesteiger & Bjerke, 1999). While seemingly paradoxical, a 
high rate of reported near-miss events may signal a healthy organization, as it suggests 
that employees are willing to document their occurrence to facilitate organizational 
learning. This is supported by meta-analyses that show organizations with a good safety 
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culture typically have higher rates of reported critical near-miss events than those with a 
poor safety culture (Probst & Brubaker, 2008; Reason, 2008). Part of the reason why 
higher rates of near-miss events may be regarded as healthy is that it reflects a proactive 
channel of information and communication about safety issues, which enables an 
organization to anticipate and prevent problems (Parker & Collin, 2010; Reason, 2008). 
Near-miss event reporting shares similarities with proactive safety behaviors (i.e., 
they both involve voicing about a negative event, they are both reporting-type 
behaviors, and they both seek to change existing systems). Most notable is the fact that 
both behaviors carry a high risk to employees when they are enacted, as they have the 
potential to be interpreted unfavorably by the organization and responded to 
accordingly. For this reason, both proactive behaviors and near-miss event reporting are 
difficult to promote among employees. Based on their shared characteristics, it might be 
reasonable to assume that an environment that tries to reduce the perceived risk of 
communicating negative information will observe an increase in proactive safety 
behaviors, but also an increase in the reporting of near-miss events. This is consistent 
with theoretical writings that associate a positive safety culture, in particular trust that 
raising safety issues will be responded to fairly, with a greater willingness to engage in 
reporting behaviors (e.g., Burns, Mearns & McGeorge, 2006; Reason, 1998).  
Less effective at promoting near-miss event reporting are prosocial behaviors. 
These beahviors focus on building cooperative and supportive relationships between 
members, rather than on communicating information that has the potential to lead to 
negative consequence. This is especially true if near-miss event reporting may lead to 
the identification, and unjust discipline, of a colleague. Based on this reasoning, we 
predict that:  
Hypothesis 4: Proactive safety behaviors are positively related to the rate of near-
miss event reports.  




The study hypotheses were tested using a longitudinal design. Self-report data 
on prosocial and proactive safety behaviors were collected at the outset of the study. Six 
months later, objective safety performance data were collected from the organization for 
the time that had elapsed since the first phase of data collection. Safety performance 
data were collected at the work group level (this is the level at which the participating 
organizations recorded such data; to ensure employee anonymity). Past research shows 
that group level data are generally more predictive of safety outcomes when compared 
to individual level data (Beus, Payne, Bergman & Arthur, 2010). In part, this is due to 
the fact that some safety outcomes, such as accidents, are relatively low in frequency 
and when measured at an individual level have reduced variance and create an increased 
risk of spurious correlations. Measuring safety performance outcomes at the group level 
reduced this problem. 
2. Method 
2.1 Sample and procedure 
Participants were frontline employees recruited from two chemical plants 
operated by different companies within Italy. One plant (P1) focused on manufacturing, 
logistics and research/development. The other plant (P2) focused on plastic production. 
Each plant had achieved Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series 18001 
certification. This certification ensures that companies formulate goals and policies 
regarding the Health and Safety of Workers as required by the regulations and in 
accordance the dangers and risks potentially present in the workplace.  
Questionnaires were distributed to a total of 753 employees across both plants. 
Of these, 213 questionnaires were returned in P1 (64% response rate), and 298 in P2 
(71% response rate) to give a total sample of 511 cases. The majority of participants 
were male (P1 = 68.2%; P2 = 83.6%), which is characteristic of the industry. The 
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average age of employees was 37.4 years (P1: M = 33.3; SD = 8.1; Range 20 – 66; P2: 
M = 40.1, SD = 8.3, Range 18 - 66). Just over half of participants (56.3%) were 
educated to a high school diploma level, with an average length of service within the 
plant of 8.4 years (P1 = 7.4; P2 = 9.3). In both plants, the majority of participants were 
employed in production (P1 = 54.5%; P2= 61.3%) followed by logistics (P1 = 17.6%; 
P2 = 18.7%). 
Questionnaires were distributed to employees by the first author in a sealed 
envelope together with instructions for their completion. Distribution took place during 
the beginning of regular monthly meetings that focused on planning the activities of the 
work team. Participants were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality, and informed 
that their responses would be used mainly for academic purposes, with a short summary 
of the overall findings being submitted to their company for the purposes of learning 
and improvement. Completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher at the end 
of the same planning meeting. Objective data on safety performance outcomes (e.g., 
micro-accidents, injury) were taken directly from the health and safety archive data 
collected by the company for each shift work team.  
2.2 Measures 
Prosocial and proactive safety behaviors. Employees’ prosocial and proactive 
safety behaviors were measured by using 19 items from Hofmann et al.’s (2003) safety 
citizenship scale. Prosocial safety behaviors were measured using the two sub-scales of 
helping and acts of stewardship, and proactive safety behaviors were measured using 
the two subscales of voice and initiating change. Example items for prosocial safety 
behaviors are ‘Help other members of the team with their responsibilities related to 
safety’ (helping) and ‘Take action to protect other members of the group in risky 
situations’ (stewardship) (α = .94). Example items for proactive safety behaviors are 
‘Raise suggestions even if others disagree’ (voice) and ‘Try to improve work 
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procedures to make them safer’ (initiating change) (α = .92). Participants responded to 
all items on a five-point scale that ranged from Never (0) to Frequently (4).  
Although Hofmann et al. (2003) modeled prosocial and proactive safety 
behaviors as a single construct, we retained them as distinct entities in this study to stay 
consistent with our predictions. This type of distinction is consistent with other studies 
that use a similar classification (McAllister et al., 2007; van Dyne & LePine, 1998). 
Moreover, it is supported by studies that show distinct outcomes for each set of 
behaviors (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Williams & Geller, 2000).1  
 Safety performance outcome measures. Participating chemical plants provided 
data on the rate of micro-accidents, property damage, lost time injuries, and near-miss 
events. These measures were provided at a shift-work group level, rather than per each 
individual.  
 Control variables. We controlled for the effects of age and team function on 
safety behavior outcomes within our analyses. Age, as measured in years, was taken as 
the mean average across all members in the group. Team function refers to the area of 
work a team specializes in. This comprised seven categories reflecting manufacturing 
production, chemical production, supply chain and maintenance, utilities and support, 
research and development, engineering, and contractors. Each team was scored as 
belonging to one of these areas.  
3. Results 
3.1 Discriminate validity of safety behaviors 
The validity of our proposal that safety behaviors may be differentiated into 
prosocial and proactive acts was tested using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The 





= 374.59, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .08 (95% C.I. = .07, .09). This fit was 
better than a four-factor model in which each set of behaviors (voice, initiating change, 
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helping and stewardship) was modeled separately, χ2(146) = 370.95, p < .001, CFI = .94, 
RMSEA = .09 (95% C.I. = .07, .10), Δχ2(1) = 3.64, p < .05; and a model in which all 
four dimensions loaded onto a single second order ‘citizenship’ factor, χ2(148) = 413.07, p 
< .001, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .10 (95% C.I. = .07, .10), Δχ2(1) = 38.48, p < .001. We also 
tested a single factor model on which all behaviors loaded to examine for any potential 
bias effects related to the fact that all safety behaviors were self-report (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). This showed the worst fit to the data, χ2(152) = 
1033,7, p < .001, CFI = .78, RMSEA = .18 (95% C.I. = .17, .19). These results support 
the discriminate validity of two distinct categories of prosocial and proactive safety 
behaviors. Table 1 shows means, standard deviations and correlations among study 
variables.  
3.2 Prosocial behaviors, Proactive behaviors, and Safety Performance Outcomes  
To analyze the effect of prosocial and proactive safety behaviors on safety 
performance outcome measures (micro-accidents, property damage, lost workday 
accidents, and near-misses), behavioral data were aggregated to a shift work-team level. 
This meant that all variables (safety behaviors and safety performance outcomes) were 
at the same level of measurement. The two plants from which data were collected 
comprised 32 shift work-teams, which was a sufficient number to allow for reliable 
analysis at this level (LeBreton & Sentler, 2008). Independent t-tests showed no 
significant differences between the two plants in their levels of prosocial safety 
behaviors, t(509) = 1.22, p = .30, or proactive safety behaviors, t(509) = .40, p = .61, thus 
supporting their aggregation to a single sample for analysis. The suitability of the 
behavioral data for aggregation to a work-team level was examined by calculating the 
Rwj(i) index (Le Breton et al., 2008). This statistic provides a measure of agreement 
between employees belonging to the same work-team, with a value of .70 generally 
regarded as the minimal level acceptable for aggregation of individual data to group 
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data (Le Breton et al., 2008). In the 32 work-teams used in this study, the Rwj(i) was 
greater than .70, with a mean value of .82 (min = .71, max = .94). This supports 
aggregation of the data to the group level.   
The research hypotheses were tested through hierarchical regression analysis at 
the group level. The control variables of age and team function were entered in Step 1, 
and prosocial and proactive safety behaviours were entered in Step 2. The team function 
variable was coded so that manufacturing production was our reference work function 
group against which all other groups were compared. We chose this work function as 
our reference variable because this team function was the one with the largest number of 
groups. To perform the analyses, a bootstrapping method was used (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). This method is appropriate when sample sizes are relatively small because it 
produces a distribution using the observed data, from which statistical effects are 
estimated. This method was considered more reliable than a non-bootstrapping 
approach in the current sample, owing to the fact that only 32 work-teams were 
included in the analysis.  
Table 2 shows the results of the analyses testing the four proposed effects. 
Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, the results show that prosocial safety behaviors 
negatively predict the rate of micro-accidents and property damage at six months. Work 
groups defined by high levels of affiliation are less likely to experience these outcomes 
over time. Similarly, the results show support for hypotheses 3 and 4, in that proactive 
safety behaviors predict low rates of lost-time injuries over time, and predict higher 
rates of near-miss events (as measured through employee reporting). We did not find 
any support for prosocial safety behaviors predicting lost-time injuries or near-miss 
events, or for proactive safety behaviors predicting micro-accidents or property damage. 
We also found no effects of age or team function on either of the safety behaviour 
outcome measures.  




Employees’ active participation in safety is often measured as a single construct. 
However, emerging research suggests that differences exist within this construct 
between prosocial and proactive safety behaviors (Conchie, 2013; Curcuruto et al., 
2013). The current study tested this emerging proposal by examining the relationship of 
prosocial safety behaviors (e.g., helping) and proactive safety behaviors (e.g., voice) 
with different safety performance outcomes. Consistent with emerging research, the 
results showed that prosocial behaviors within teams predicts the rate of micro-
accidents and property damage, while proactive behaviors predict the rate of lost time 
injuries and near-miss event reporting. No cross over effects between the behaviors and 
safety outcomes emerged. 
These results support and extend the proposal that employees’ participation in 
safety has a significant impact on an organization’s safety performance (Christian et al., 
2009). In support of this proposal, the study found that safety behaviors predicted the 
rate of accidents and near-miss reporting, and that this effect was significant over a six-
month period. Second, the results showed that prosocial and proactive safety behaviors 
operate independently to influence these outcome measures. At a theoretical level, this 
suggests an extension to existing models of safety to reflect this behavioral difference. 
By regarding these behaviors as one construct, as safety research often does, important 
differences may have been overlooked, and significant effects may have failed to 
emerge. By extending safety models to look at two behavioral routes, it should be 
possible to develop a more detailed understanding of routes through which safety 
outcomes occur. These routes will not only focus on different safety behaviors, but also 
their antecedents. At present, this level of understanding in safety literature is missing.       
At a practical level, the findings suggest that interventions aimed at improving 
an organization’s safety performance would be most effective if they were targeted at 
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specific safety behaviors associated with these outcomes. When the outcomes are 
micro-accidents or property damage, organizations are likely to notice the greatest 
marked change if they focus on promoting helping among co-workers. When the 
outcomes are lost work-time injuries or near-miss event reporting, the organization 
would benefit most from promoting and supporting challenging proactive safety 
behaviors, such as raising suggestions for change. While both classes of behavior 
(prosocial and proactive) play an important role in promoting safety, interventions or 
training initiatives that focus too heavily on the entire class of behaviors, or on those 
behaviors unrelated to the outcome, may observe minimal improvements. 
Research focusing on human resource management, work design and work 
performance, have highlighted ways in which these two classes of behavior may be 
promoted (Gagné & Panaccio, 2014; Parker, 2014; Strauss & Parker, 2014). According 
to a human resource management perspective, organizations may increase proactive 
safety behaviors by investing in communication strategies that focus on rewarding 
employees for going above and beyond mandatory safety behaviors. A public reward 
system for raising suggestions about safety, for example, would provide employees with 
a visible demonstration of commitment from management when they offer meaningful 
feedback, and would reduce perceptions of risk associated with these behaviors (Strauss 
& Parker, 2014). These types of initiatives would send a top-down message to 
employees that their involvement in safety is important and recognized positively by the 
organization, which enhances feelings of competence and safety motivation (Strauss & 
Parker, 2014), but also trust in the organization. The importance of worker trust for the 
success of such initiatives and ultimately good safety cannot be underestimated. 
Building on the work of Reason (1998), Burns et al. (2006) argue that trust is needed to 
foster organizational learning and ultimately a positive safety culture. In support of this, 
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other studies have shown the importance of trust in management for promoting 
reporting-type behaviors (e.g., Conchie et al., 2012). 
Similarly, research on job design has suggested that proactive behaviors may be 
promoted by focusing on characteristics of the task (Parker, 2014). For example, 
research shows that proactive safety behavior may be promoted by reinforcing and 
increasing levels of autonomy and self-determination in carrying out duties and/or 
promoting, where appropriate, action in favor of safety through appropriate incentive 
systems (Gagné & Panaccio, 2014; Strauss & Parker, 2014). In this way, organizations 
may make employees aware that they are not only expected to react to top-down 
management safety systems in the workplace, but that they may engage in bottom-up 
initiatives through their participation in safety. As such, they may help the organization 
to manage grey areas—those areas that may not be easily managed with the ordinary 
and formalized safety systems and procedures. In contrast, research on job design 
suggests that prosocial behaviors may be effectively promoted by focusing on the social 
aspects of teamwork (Parker, 2014). This may include reinforcing interdependence, 
cohesion, and peer-to-peer communication; which serve to enhance affiliative 
motivation, mutual trust and a positive psychological atmosphere in the workgroup 
(Curcuruto et al., 2013; Grant & Parker, 2009; Parker, 2014). One outcome of this may 
be an increase in prosocial behaviors, such as looking out for the safety of others when 
carrying out job tasks. 
The study is not without its limitations. First, due to the way in which the 
participating organizations recorded outcome safety performance data, it was not 
possible to look at the relationship between safety behaviors and safety events at an 
individual level. While this limited our ability to map the relationship between behavior 
and involvement in a safety event for each individual, it avoided problems associated 
with low accident rates and spurious correlations that can emerge when data are 
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examined at this level. One advantage of examining safety outcomes at a work-team 
level is that the variance in outcome measures is larger and so results are more reliable. 
 Second, because we examined safety behaviors and safety performance on only 
one occasion, some caution must be taken when interpreting the results as implying 
strong causation. The separation of our measures by six-months offers some confidence 
in our conclusions regarding the effects of proactive and prosocial behaviors on safety 
outcomes, especially when compared to cross-sectional research. However, it does not 
allow us to infer the same level of causation as with longitudinal studies involving 
measures at multiple time periods. While we expect our effects to emerge across a 
longer time period, future work would benefit from testing this prediction. 
Third, we did not control for the effects of safety compliance behaviors in our 
analyses. Consequently, we cannot state how strong the relationships are between 
proactive and prosocial safety behaviors with the outcome measures after we factor out 
their relationship with safety compliance. In the current study a proxy measure of safety 
compliance behaviors, namely short-cuts propensity, was collected. Our analyses 
showed that this measure did not aggregate to a group level (F = 1.17, p = .35). At a 
statistical level, this precluded it from the current, group-level, analysis. At a theoretical 
level, we suggest rather tentatively that it may imply that complying with rules is not 
group dependent. If so, this suggests that an individual’s tendency to comply with safety 
may shape their tendency to actively participate in safety when working independently. 
However, when in a team, it is the group norms that have a stronger influence on safety 
participation behaviors. Further work may test this tentative suggestion, and if not 
supported, control for the effects of safety compliance when re-examining the 
relationships we focus on here. 
Finally, this study focused on the chemical industry within Italy and for this 
reason it is unclear how far the results generalize to other contexts. Research on other 
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safety-relevant variables, such as leadership, culture and climate, has shown that effects 
replicate in different contexts and in different countries (Mearns & Yule, 2009), and so 
we would expect the results reported here to generalize.  
In summary, this study showed that the effects of prosocial and proactive safety 
behaviors on safety performance outcomes can be differentiated. Future models of 
safety should consider this finding in deciding whether it is appropriate to model ‘safety 
participation’ as a single construct, or if a detailed model that teases these behaviors 
apart would be more insightful. The suggestion from the study reported here is that 
gains can be made from looking at prosocial acts as a distinct set of behaviors to 
proactive acts, and examining their relationship to different organizational processes. In 
this way, it should be possible to tailor interventions to have maximum impact. 
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1 The current study did not use Hofmann et al.’s two sub-scales that relate to civic 
virtue and whistleblowing. This was due, in part, to a request by participating 
plants to keep the questionnaire short. It was also because these two subscales 
relate to work contexts regulated by specific legal regulation. In the present 
national context, these are known to encounter resistance by the work-unions. 
Excluding these subscales therefore avoided any biases on the study results from 
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Table 1.  
Means, standard deviations and correlations among observed variables at the team level (N=32) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Prosocial safety behaviors  3.31  .71 
--       
2. Proactive safety behaviors 3.35  .54 
     .74*** --      
3. Micro-accidents   .89  .77 
-.57* -.31 --     
4. Lost work day injuries  .37  .34 
-.14 -.40*   .42* --    
5. Near miss  .79  .90 
.30  .46* .32 .34 --   
6. Property damage   .85 1.51 
-.42* -.35 .37   .45* .29 --  
7. No shortcut behaviors 4.33 .29 
.37* .41* -.20 -.13 .12 -.11 -- 
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Table 2.                                                                                                                                                     
Results of hierarchical regression analysis testing hypotheses effects by prosocial safety 
behaviors (H1, H2) on safety performance outcomes after 6 months (Nteams=32) 
 Micro accidents 
Antecedents Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 95% confidence intervals  
(at step 3) 
  β t β t β t Min Max 
Team function -.30 -1.28 -.23 -1.01 -.19 -1.30 -.08 .02 
No shortcuts beh.   -.20 -.93 -.10 -.43 -.73 .33 
Proactive safety beh.     -.01 -.04 -.86 .37 
Prosocial safety beh.     -.56 -.2.27* -.92 -.06 
R2  .09  .19  .44   
ΔR2    .10  .25   
F  1.63  1.85  2.84   
 Property damages (accidents without injuries) 
Antecedents Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 95% confidence intervals 
(at step 3) 
  β t β t β t Min Max 
Team function -.51 -2.47* -.44 -2.08* -.39 -1.77 -.49 .37 
No shortcuts beh.   -.10 -.47 -.04 -.15 -2.35 3.81 
Proactive safety beh.     -.31 -1.20 -3.46 .68 
Prosocial safety beh.     -.42 -2.04* -4.8 -.12 
R2  .22  .18  .30   
ΔR2    -.04  .12   
F  6.11  3.01  2.9   
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Table 3.                                                                                                                                           
Results of hierarchical regression analysis testing hypotheses effects by proactive safety 
behaviors (H3, H4) on safety performance outcomes after 6 months (Nteams=32) 
 Lost working days 
Antecedents Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 95% confidence intervals  
(at step 3) 
  β t β t β t Min Max 
Team function -.19 -.80 -.13 -.54 -.09 -.36 -.10 .04 
No shortcuts beh.   -.10 -.43 -.06 -.27 -1.04 1.07 
Prosocial safety beh.     -.13 -.49 - 1.48 1.61 
Proactive safety beh.     -.39 -2.01* -1.9 -.08 
R2 .04 . .05  .16    
ΔR2   .01  .11    
F .64  1.68  2.15    
 Near miss (reporting) 
Antecedents Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 95% confidence intervals 
(at step 3) 
 β t β t β t Min Max 
Team function .08 .34 .09 .36 .07 .32 -.09 .10 
No shortcuts beh.   .12 .54 .10 .49 -.76 .73 
Prosocial safety beh.     .31 1.51 -1.56 .39 
Proactive safety beh.     .44 2.08* .05 1.04 
R2  .02  .04  .17   
ΔR2    .02  .13   
F  .11  .45  2.43   
Note: *p < .05.  **p < .01. 
 
